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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KINGSLEY "\VELLS, t' 
Plaintiff~ Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 
THE DENYER & RIO GRANDE ) 10605 
YVESTERN RAILROAD COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant q; Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PRELI1\1INARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for damages for personal injuries 
received in a collision at defendant's crossing between 
defendant's engine and a car in which plaintiff was a 
passenger. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LU\VER COURT 
The case was tried before the court sitting with a ' 
jury. At the close of plaintiff's testimony, the court 
directed a verdict against plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the directed verdict and , 
an order granting a new trial. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
The collision out of which this action arose took 
place and occurred at defendant's crossing at Fourth 
North Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, at approximately 
12 :12 o'clock A.M. on the 15th day of January, 1964. , 
( R. 68, 69) . Plaintiff was a passenger in an auto· 
mobile being driven westerly across the crossing by 1 
Lorne 0. Lawrence. The train involved in the accident 
consisted of a switch engine being operated on defend· 
ant's track in a southerly direction, pulling a car and 
a caboose. (R. 137). 
The crossing consists of eight sets of tracks, the 
track in question being No. 8, proceeding across in a 
westerly direction. Introduced into evidence at trial ' 
was a scale diagram prepared by Bush & Gudgell, Inc .. 
Engineers, at a scale of one inch equal to 20 feet. (Ex. 
IP). The diagram shows that the first seven tracks are 
generally parallel, proceeding in a north-south direc· 1 
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i;ion. The D&RG track in question from the north 
comes in at an angle from the northwest. See photo-
graphs (Ex. 3P-15P and 18D-21D), Exhibits 18D-
:nD. having been taken the day after the accident, and 
3P-I5P in October or November, 1965.) (R. 87, 88, 
102, 103). The evidence showed that the crossing in 
11uestion is within the city limits and that the only 
warning of this crossing is a railroad crossing sign. 
(Ex. 5P, lOP, 20D). There was no crossing watchman 
and 110 flashing light or gate to warn of the particular 
train in question. (R. 71, 79, 141). The scale diagram 
shows that the distance from the first set of tracks to 
the D&RG track is 135 feet. There are no obstructions 
between the entrance of the crossing and the D&RG 
track looking north of the crossing. (R. 72, 73). 
Lorne 0. Lawrence was employed by the Union 
Pacific Railroad Company as a pipefitter and was giv-
ing the plaintiff a ride home from the Union Pacific 
Shop where the plaintiff was also employed. Plaintiff's 
regular ride to and from work was with a fell ow em-
ployee who had his day off at the time in question, and 
he had arranged with .Mr. Lawrence to give him a ride 
home from work on one day a week. (R. 78). .Mr. 
Lawrence customarily would drop Mr. 'Vells off on 
Ninth North, with ~Ir. Lawrence proceeding west 
from that point to his own home. l\fr. Lawrence gave 
this ride to Mr. "Tells as a favor. (R. 77-79). Mr. Law-
rence described the lighting conditions at the crossing 
in question as being very poor, there being a light on 
the east and two to the west of the crossing by some 
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buildings to the north and south. ( R. 79, 80). There 
were numerous lights in the background looking to 
the north from the crossing by reason of lights from a 
refinery and houses and a small business building. (R. 
73, 74, 81). The overpass at Fifth North was not com. 
pleted at the time of the accident, and l\lr. Lawrencf 
described the crossing in question as being a heavily 
traveled crossing, both generally and during the hom:, 
around midnight. ( R. 82) . 
After work on the night in question l\Ir. Lawrentt 
met plaintiff and proceded on his way home, he driving 
and .Mr. 'Vells sitting on the right side of the front 
seat. He pulled out of the shop and drove a block east 
and then south on Third 'Vest to Fourth North Street, 1 
where he made a right turn and proceded west to the 
railroad crossing, driving with his headlights on. (R 
83). Lawrence drove to the railroad tracks, stopped 
the car, looked both ways, and then proceeded acros~ 
the tracks at approximately 10 miles per hour. As ht 
proceeded across the tracks, he continued at a uniform 
speed of 10 miles per hour, looking in both directions. 
He was looking for possible railroad traffic on any 
one of the eight sets of tracks, coming from either di-
rection. He did not see any lights or hear any whistle. 
continually moving at a slow speed. The next thing he 
knew they were loading him in the ambulance. (R. 
84, 85). 
Damage was done to the left front pilot footboard 
of the engine and to the right front fender, hood, door. 
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windshield and frame of the automobile. ( R. 69, 70) . 
The collision was described as between the left front 
eorner of the engine and the right front corner of the 
automohile. ( R. 160). The switch engine proceeded 
south, past the intersection 204 feet before coming to 
a stop. and the car moved southerly along the tracks 
80 feet from the point of impact. The point of impact 
was located 27 feet north from the curb line of Fourth 
X orth Street at the track in question. (R. 69, 70, 71). 
(Exhibit 2P). The windows of the car were up. (R. 89). 
Lawrence testified that he had crossed this same 
crossing on numerous other occasions and was generally 
familiar with it. 'Vhile approaching the crossing, when 
he sees equipment approaching on the tracks, he usually 
stops before crossing the first track, for the reason that 
he never knows what direction other trains may come 
from. For this reason, his usual procedure, once ascer-
taining that the way is clear, is to start across and con-
tllme moving over all of the tracks. ( R. 104, 105) . 
Plaintiff called as a witness the engineer of the 
train mvolved, Lawrence 'Villiam O'Driscoll. Mr. 
O'Driscoll testified that he was on the right side of 
the engine and could not see to the left; that he relied 
entirely on the fireman and the switchman, who were 
sitting on the left. The fireman has visibility to the left 
and front of the engine as it is moving forward. (R. 
135-137). Mr. O'Driscoll testified that he was familiar 
with the D&RG book of rules, and in particular with 
Rule 937, which reads: 
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"An engineman must use the utmost caut1· 
t .1 
. . on 
o prevent stri \:mg persons, vehicles, [stock] or 
other obstacles." 
And further with Rule 949, with respect to the duties 
of the fireman : 
"vVhile engine is moving, aud when his other 
duties permit, fireman must keep a careful look-
out, giving engineman instant and understand-
able notice of any hand, lantern, fusee, or fixed 
signals, or conditions that affect the train move-
ment. He must also be alert for signals from 
train or engineman of other trains and commu-
nicate same, promptly, to engineman." 
l\fr. O'Driscoll testified that as the train approached 
the crossing in question, it takes a long gradual cum 
to the right. (R. 139, 140). He further testified that 
he was traveling at approximately 20 miles per hour, 
approaching the crossing and relying entirely on the 
fireman for lookout to the front and left; that the first 
and only warning received from the fireman was that 
he hollered "Big Hole," and that just about the time 
he hollered "Big Hole," he hit the car in question. He 
testified as follows, (R. 141, 142): 
"Q So, as far as any westbound traffic was con· 
cerned, you were relying entirely upon the fire· 
man? 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q And I will ask you to state whether you 
ever received any word-notification from the 
fireman as to an automobile being on those tracks 
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as you came along, approaching nearer and 
nearer to that crossing? 
"A No until we got pretty near to the crossing. 
~\tht" "Q. 'Vhat happened you got 'pretty near 
to the crossing?' 
"A. He hollered 'Big Hole.' I went to emer-
gency. 
"Q At the time he hollered Big Hole,' did the 
accident happen? 
"A Yes, about that time. 
"Q Just about the time he hollered 'Big Hole,' 
you hit something? 
"A Yes, sir. 
"Q Up until the time you hit something, you 
had never seen anything at all that you hit? 
"A That's right. 
* * * 
"Q Did you ever see the object you hit before 
you hit it? 
"A No, sir. 
"Q And, up to the point where the fireman yelled 
'Big Hole it,' had you ever slowed down the 
engine? 
"A No." 
On cross examination Mr. O'Driscoll testified that 
he blew the whistle for the particular crossing, giving 
two longs, a short, and a long, which is the pattern which 
he always follows when he approaches a crossing, ac-
cording to the rules of the railroad. (R. 144). 
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Plaintiff called Raymond A. J aensch as a witness. 
J aensch testified that he witnessed the collision. He 
stated that he was in the vicinity of a light pole just 
short of halfway between Fourth North Street and 
Fifth North Street. He was walking on a roadway 
northerly, between the Rio Grande mainline track and 
the U. P. tracks. He identified the pole as the one 
labeled "Power Pole" on the scale diagram. This power 
pole, according to the scale of the diagram, is some 280 
feet north of the crossing. J aensch testified that he 
observed the train approaching the crossing, traveling 
at between 20 to 30 miles per hour. ( R. 162) . He 
observed the automobile from some 25 feet before reach· 
ing the first track and moving across the crossing, and 
for some reason just kept watching the automobile 
moving at a uniform speed to the point of the accident. 
(R. 155, 161). 
"A Did the car move uniformly across the cross-
ing? 
"A Yes; this is one of the reasons I continued 
watching-it never hestitated or anything. It 
continued at an even speed." 
The train started to blow the whistle at approximately 
Fifth North in a sequence of whistles. The whistle 
ended somewhere between the point where J aensch was 
standing and the crossing, J aensch being unable to 
pinpoint exactly where. ( R. 156, 157). 
The plaintiff at the time that the car was being 
driven across the tracks was sitting on the right-hand 
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side of the front seat, resting his eyes, when the accident 
happened. He was not aware of the existence of the 
train prior to the accident. (R. 109). The next thing 
he was0~,-~f was someone telling him and Lawrence 
to stay where they were, that an ambulance was coming. 
(R. llO). 
The court directed the jury to return a verdict of 
No Cause of Action, which was done. (R. 46-A). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECT-
ING A VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFF. 
On appeal from a directed verdict, this court has 
the duty of reviewing the evidence in a light most favor-
able to plaintiff. Graham v. Johnson ( 1946), 109 Utah 
346, 166 P.2d 230. 
Plaintiff's theory of liability was contained in Re-
quested Instruction No. 7 submitted to the court. (R. 
37) . This request stated as follows: 
"If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence, first, that the fireman on defendant's 
engine observed the automobile occupied by 
plaintiff as it approached and crossed the tracks 
leading to the track occupied by said engine; and 
second, that said fireman knew, or in the exercise 
of ordinary care should have known, that the 
driver of said automobile was unaware of the 
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approach of said engine; and third, that the said 
fireman failed and neglected to exercise care in 
taking reasonable measures to avoid collision with 
said automobile, then and in that event, you are 
instructed that said defendant was negligent· 
* * *" ' 
It is plaintiff's theory that the railroad was negli-
gent in failing to keep a proper lookout and on observ-
ing the uniform approach of the Lawrence automobile 
into the track in question, that the crew should haye 
taken action, either by giving additional warning or in 
reducing the speed so as to be able to stop if necessary. 
Inasmuch as plaintiff was not guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, in that he was seated in the car resting 
his eyes, the court in reaching its decision had to hold 
as a matter of law that there was no evidence from 
which the jury could find the defendant negligent, and 
that said negligence proximately caused damages to 
plaintiff. All reasonable men could not agree to this 
from the record in this case. 
The duty of the railroad is well stated in the case 
of Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., (1932), 79 Utah 
439, I I P .2d 305, at page 45I: 
"It of course is well established that the right 
of the public to the use of a public crossing is 
mutual, coextensive, and reciprocal with that 
of the railway company, except that the latter, 
because of the momentum of trains, the confine· 
ment of their movements to the track, and the 
necessity and public nature of railway traffic, 
has the unquestioned right of way. Such prece· 
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dence, however, does not impose upon the trav-
eler the whole duty of avoiding collisions. Both 
parties mnst exercise dne care and diligence with 
regard to their duties and are charged with the 
mutual duty of exercising reasonable care and 
diligence to prevent injury, and that the per-
formance of snch duty may, to a limited extent, 
be relied on by each. * * *" (Italics ours) . 
The reciprocal duties of the parties are well stated 
in the comment following Section 480, American Law 
Institute Restatement of the Law of Torts, 2d, at page 
336: 
Thus, if an engineer of a train approaching a lev-
el highway crossing sees a traveler approaching 
the track on foot or in a vehicle, he is not immedi-
ately required to take any steps either to warn 
the traveler by an additional blast of his whistle 
or to bring the train under special control, since 
he is entitled to assume that the traveler has dis-
covered or will discover the oncoming train and 
will stop before reaching the crossing. However, 
it is not necessary that the circumstances be such 
as to convince the defendant that the plaintiff 
is inattentive and, therefore, in danger. It is 
enough that the circumstances are such M to 
indicate a reasonable chance that this is the case. 
Even snch a chance that the plaintiff will not 
discover his peril is enough to require the de-
fendant to make a reasonable effort to avoid 
injnring him. Therefore, if there is anytlUng 
in the demeanor or conduct of the plaintiff which 
to a reasonable man in the defendant's positiop;.; · 
would indicate that the plaintiff is inattfnit'7';e 
and, therefore, will or may not discover ~e ap-. ' \' 
proach of the train, the engineer_'{t_U!l>t takes~ 
11 ~~' ~~/ 
steps as a reasonable man would think necessary 
under the circumstances. If a train is at son{e 
little distance, the blowing of a whistle would 
ordinarily be enough, until it is apparent that 
the whistle is either unheard or disregarded. The 
situation in which the plaintiff is observed mar 
clea~ly indicate that his i~attention is likely t~ 
persist, and that the blowmg of the whistle will 
not be effective. If so, the engineer is not en-
titled to act upon the assumption that the plain-
tiff will awaken to his danger, but may be liable 
if he does not so reduce the speed of his train 
as to enable him to stop if necessary." (Italics 
ours). 
It is submitted that this case falls squarely within 
the language above. The evidence shows that the fire-
man who presumably was keeping a sharp lookout to 
the front and left of the train as it approached the 
crossing failed to say one word until it was too late to 
do anything about the accident. The fireman gave the 
warning, "Big Hole," and the accident happened im-
mediately, according to the testimony of the engineer. 
'Vith unobstructed vision between the engine and the 
crossing the fireman should have seen the same thing 
that Raymond J aensch saw. He could have seen the 
automobile coming across the seven sets of tracks slowly 
at a uniform speed and failing to alter his speed one 
iota in spite of the warnings which were being given 
in the customary required sequence. Yet, the fireman 
failed to say anything. The jury could well find this 
to be negligence on the part of the railroad. There was 
something about the situation which caused J aensch 
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to pay particular attention to it. There was something 
about the way the car kept proceeding across the tracks 
that caused J aensch to be apprehensive and certainly 
should have caused the fireman, who had the duty to 
take action. 
This situation is somewhat analagous to the last 
clear chance situation held in the case of Thompson 
v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., (1898), 16 Utah 281, 
52 P. 92. The case at bar, however, is stronger than 
the Thompson case, inasmuch as plaintiff is not guilty 
of contributory negligence. The Thompson case dealt 
with a deaf mute, 15-year-old boy, crossing the tracks 
of the defendant at an angle, with his back toward the 
defendant's approaching car. The operator there ob-
served the boy, rang the bell, and then observing that 
the bell did not attract his attention, attempted to stop 
the car but failed and struck the boy, carrying him a 
distance of about 58 feet before stopping. The evi-
dence was that the rear brake of the car was loose and 
kicked off ; that the brakes in the car were not in good 
condition and had not been in good condition for some 
time. The trial court submitted the case to the jury 
under the doctrine of the last clear chance, and this 
court affirmed, stating in part: 
" * * * If the defendant knowingly placed 
in operation upon the public street a defective 
car, that could not be controlled because the ap-
pliances provided for that purpose were out of 
repair, and the injury complained of was occa-
sioned by such defective brakes and appliances, 
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and the motorman was unable to avoid the effect · 
of the contributory negligence of the deceased 
because of such defects, then it would probabh'. 
be said that the defendant's negligence was th~ 
proximate cause of the injury." 
It is submitted that just as in the Thompson case, 
the fireman, as a reasonable man, should have realized 
that the automobile in question was proceeding across 
the seven sets of tracks despite the warning being given 
by the engineer. 
It will be recalled that Lawrence stated that the 
proper way to cross the tracks was to proceed across 
all of the tracks, once ascertaining that they were clear, 1 
for the reason that a person would be in danger from 
traffic on other tracks if he proceeded part way acros~ 
and stopped for a given track. This certainly appears 
to be a reasonable way of proceeding across a group 
of railway tracks. Reasonable men could so find. 
In addition to this, reasonable men could find that 
the engineer stopped blowing his whistle at some dis· 
tance prior to reaching the crossing from the testimony 
of Raymond J aensch. J aensch testified that the whistle 
stopped blowing somewhere between his position and 
the crossing. Reasonable men could certainly find that . 
additional warnings would have avoided the accident. 
Obviously this is a jury question. 
The alternative is that the fireman was keepi,ng 
no lookout until the irudant of the accident, which would . 
most certainly be negligence. 
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As the Pippy case and numerous other cases have 
stated, the railroad has a duty to keep a reasonable 
lookout at crossings. It is stated at 44 Am. J ur., par. 
510, RAILROADS, at page 750: 
"At ordinary crossings it is the duty of the 
railroad company to keep a reasonable lookout, 
and if the crossing is hazardous because of fre-
quent vehicular traffic or obscured view of the 
traYclers, the lookout must be correspondingly 
sharp. "\Vhat would answer the requirements of 
a reasonable lookout depends, among other 
things, upon the amount and kind of travel rea-
sonably to be expected over the crossing, and 
the presence or absence of safeguards such as 
flagmen, gates, or electric signals." 
The crossing involved in this lawsuit is within the 
city limits and is a heavily traveled crossing, and a 
crossing that does not have flashing light signals, bar-
riers, or a crossing watclunan. In view of these aspects, 
the railroad has a duty of keeping a careful lookout; 
and when the fireman can observe a vehicle crossing 
slowly, approaching the track, a jury can find that he 
has a duty of doing something more than sitting inert 
until it is too late to avoid the accident. The protection 
of human life at such crossings deserves a greater duty 
of care than was observed in this case. 
Taking Lawrence's testimony that he was travel-
ing IO miles per hour, he would be traveling approxi-
mately 15 feet per second, and for a distance of 160 
feet from where J aensch first saw him to the track 
in question. At this rate it would take him 10.7 seconds. 
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This means that for a period of 10.7 seconds the Law. 
rence car is in full view of the fireman, who cannot help 
but observe that he was continuing into the point of 
collision. Reasonable men could find that the fireman 
should have done something more in this situatiot. 
Taking the testimony of J aensch, the routine series ot' 
whistles were started by the engineer approximate]\ 
one block from the crossing. These whistles were bein;, 
~ 
blown and heard by the fireman at the very time 
that the car was proceeding uniformly into the place 
of collision. During these same 10. 7 seconds the engine, 
if traveling at 25 miles per hour, was traveling approx1· 
mately 396 feet. Who can say that one word of cautio11 
from the fireman, with a corresponding reduction of 
speed by the engineer or an additional blast of the 
whistle by the engineer, would not have avoided the 
collision and crippling injuries to the plaintiff. 
The spirit of the statement contained in the Re· 
statement of Torts above demands that when any doubt 
exists, the train crew must act. Obviously the firemau 
in this case failed to live up to the spirit of this re· 
quirement. The least that could be said is that men 
of reasonable intelligence could differ as to the con-
clusion drawn from the facts in this case. This being , 
so, defendant's negligence was a question for the jury 
and not for the court. 
It is well established that in close or doubtful 
cases the law requires the case to be submitted to the 
jury. This is indicated by a quotation from the case 
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of Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 
134 P. 567, 570, which was contained in the opinion 
in the case of Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co., 122 Utah 
477, 485, 251 P.2d 867! 
"The court can pass upon the question of neg-
ligence only in clear cases, * * * 
" * * -:i:- Unless the question of negligence is 
free from doubt, the court cannot pass upon it 
as a question of law; ·:!f * * if * * * the court is 
in doubt whether reasonable men, * * * might 
arrive at different conclusions then this very 
doubt determines the question to be one of fact 
for the jury and not one of law for the court." 
This comt stated unequivocally the strong policy of 
the law in protecting the right of trial by jury at page 
485 in the Stickle case: 
"Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of the 
vital importance of the privilege of trial by jury 
in our system of justice and deem it our duty to 
zealously protect and preserve it." 
Also see Robison v. Robison, ( 1964), 16 Utah 2d 2, 
394 P.2d 876, and DeWeese v. J. C. Penney Co., 
(1956), 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898. 
It is submitted that the case at bar is not even 
one of those close or doubtful cases requiring the sub-
mission of the case to the jury as specified by the above 
cases but is a case where the evidence clearly shows 
negligence on the part of the def end ant. For instance, 
the case at bar is a much stronger case than the case 
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of ~lorby v. Rogers, (1953), 122 Utah 540, 252 P.2r] 
231, where the court submitted the question of last 
clear chance to the jury. The court, following Section 
480 of the Restatement of Torts and Graham v. John. 
son, supra, held that it was a jury question, relying, 
only on the testimony of defendant himself and the 
physical facts. The Morby case involved the defendant 
hitting plaintiff, a boy, on a bicycle traveling the same 
direction. According to defendant's testimony, he wa, 1 
traveling 25 miles per hour when he first obse1Ted tht · 
boy on the bicycle, traveling the same direction, abou' , 
300 feet ahead of him. At about 200 feet he sounded 
his horn but at no time did the boy ever give any inrli· , 
cation that he heard any warning of defendant's ap· 
proach. Based on these facts, the court held that it 
l 
would not be unreasonable for the jury to find tha1 
the boy was oblivious to his approach. Defendant said 
he first realized the danger of collision at 78 feet from 
the point of impact, and that he did not sound his horn, 
until 20 feet from the boy, at which point he started , 
to turn to his left. The court held that at the point of 
78 feet the defendant could have either applied his 
brakes or sounded his horn, and that the jury could 
find that his failure to do so was negligence under tht' 
doctrine of last clear chance. 
It is submitted that there is more evidence for the 
jury to base a finding of negligence in the case at bar 
than in the M orby v. Rogers case. In the case at bar 
there is clear evidence from which the jury could find. 
that for some 10.7 seconds the car in which plaintiff 
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was located continued to cross slowly at a uniform 
rate of speed in the face of warnings given by the 
defendant in the routine manner. The jury could find 
that the fireman should have realized that Lawrence 
was oblivious to the approach of the train and should 
haYe so notified the engineer so that he could have 
slowed dm,rn the train or given additional warning. 
It is just as obvious that if the fireman had not been 
looking at all for traffic at this unwarned, dangerous 
crossing, the jury should find the defendant negligent 
on that ground. 
The court relied on the case of Gregory v. Denver 
& Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, (1958), 
8 Utah 2d 114, 329 P.~d 407, in directing a verdict 
in this case. The only similarity between the case at bar 
and the Gregory case was that both happened at the 
same crossing. However, there are numerous differences 
which make the Gregory case not controlling to the 
decision in this case. To begin with, the Gregory case 
happened in daytime. This case happened on a dark 
night. In the Gregory case, the only evidence offered 
as to failure to keep a proper lookout was the mere 
happening of the accident itself, and the train in the 
Gregory case was a much larger train and was travel-
ing at a greater speed. It is obvious that the engine and 
two cars involved in this case could be controlled more 
easily than the large train at the greater speed involved 
in the Gregory case. In this case we have evidence 
that the car involved could be seen crossing slowly and 
uniformly a distance of 160 feet over a time period of 
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